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Social impact bonds (SIBs) have recently generated a lot of excitement nationwide as an 
innovative way to finance social projects. A SIB is a financing mechanism that uses private 
capital to fund social services, with the government only repaying investors their capital plus 
a potential return on investment if improved social outcomes are achieved. As such, it brings 
together the private, public, and non-profit sectors in a manner that unlocks an additional 
source of capital to fund social service providers, promotes innovation, encourages 
interagency cooperation, and creates more accountability. Despite these benefits, tax law 
likely hinders the development of SIB-funded programs in the United States by discouraging 
private investment in SIBs.  
This Article is the first to consider the role of U.S. tax law in promoting SIB investments 
by examining the tax implications of a SIB investment from both a doctrinal and policy 
perspective. It concludes that the current tax system creates unnecessary compliance risks for 
private SIB investors and unjustifiably treats SIB investments less favorably than comparable 
investments, thereby increasing administrative complexity, distorting investment decisions, 
and creating inequities among similarly situated investors. Given the unintended 
discriminatory tax treatment towards SIBs, this Article argues that Congress should consider 
enacting legislation to make a SIB investment a tax-favored investment. This change could 
best be achieved by extending preferential tax rates to SIB earnings, exempting SIB earnings 
from taxation, or by allowing an upfront deduction for contributions to SIB investments. By 
modifying the tax law to treat SIB investments more in parity with comparable investments, 
SIB-funded programs will likely attract additional private capital and allow SIBs to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Salt Lake County, Utah, like many other counties throughout the nation, has 
struggled with finding a meaningful and effective way to address persistent homelessness 
and high rates of recidivism within the county. 1  Current government funding for 
programs to address these issues is limited and their effectiveness is often unknown.2 The 
result is costly: 43% of persistently homeless individuals in Salt Lake County become 
chronically homeless within two years; 74% of high-risk offenders return to county jail 
within four years of their release; and the Salt Lake County jail is currently operating at 
full capacity.3 These issues also result in numerous other social and financial costs to 
society.  
In an attempt to address these issues, in December 2016, Salt Lake County 
launched a million dollar initiative to provide more than 500 of the county’s most 
vulnerable and at-risk population with innovative, evidence-based, preventative services 
never before available to these residents.4 Unlike other social programs, the government 
(and taxpayers) will not have to pay anything initially.5 Instead, investors will provide the 
upfront capital to finance the program and assume the risk of an unsuccessful program. If 
the program is successful in achieving pre-determined results, only then will the 
government repay the investors their initial capital, as well as a small return on their 
investment.6 
The structure of the Salt Lake County program is just one example of a new type 
of financing mechanism that has recently emerged: social impact bonds (“SIBs”). 7 
Although still in their infancy, SIBs have generated a lot of excitement. They have 
received support from the Obama administration, major financial institutions, policy 
experts, philanthropic organizations, and universities.8 As a result, numerous SIBs have 
                                                      
1 See SALT LAKE COUNTY PAY FOR SUCCESS INITIATIVE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 1 (2016), 
http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/161214_SLCo-PFS-FAQ-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VMW7-UTZ7] [hereinafter SLC FAQ]. 
2 See Michelle Schmidt, Salt Lake County launches two Pay for Success projects (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://slco.org/mayor/news/PFS-projects-launch/ [https://perma.cc/8ESF-49MV]. For instance, studies reveal 
that existing programs within Salt Lake County only reach approximately 19% of the persistently homeless 
population due to budget constraints. SLC FAQ, supra note 1. 
3 SLC FAQ, supra note 1. 
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 SIBs are often also referred to as pay for success contracts. Although these two terms are often 
used interchangeably, they are not always synonyms. Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention 
Programs with Social Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 964 (2012). In a joint SIB and pay for 
success contract arrangement, the government shifts the risk of economic loss from non-performance to the 
private investor, whereas in a pay-for-success contract, the risk of loss may also be shifted from the 
government to the service provider. Id. In addition, many variations of the SIB model exist. See Orly Mazur, 
Taxing Social Impact Bonds, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 431 (2017). In this Article, I use the term SIB to refer to “a 
relatively narrow and truly innovative concept where payment from government is tied solely to outcomes 
and where government places few controls on the external organization.” Jitinder Kohli, Douglas J. Besharov 
& Kristina Costa, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, What are Social Impact Bonds: An Innovative New Financing 
Tool for Social Programs, 2 (Mar. 22, 2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/social_impact_bonds_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/AND7-WK5H].  
8 See infra notes 24–33 and accompanying text. 
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already been launched in communities across the country and world to address issues 
ranging from unemployment and child welfare to education and mental illness.9 
Despite this initial excitement, SIBs have not yet generated sufficient private 
capital to truly make an impact in the United States. This Article is the first to argue that 
U.S. tax law is one factor that significantly contributes to the lack of private SIB 
investments in the United States. To demonstrate the chilling effect that the tax law has 
on these potentially powerful investments, I first describe the concept of a SIB, its 
benefits and limitations, and the likely tax implications to private SIB investors. Against 
this backdrop, I then consider from a normative perspective whether Congress should 
modify federal income tax laws to make SIBs a more tax-favored investment for private 
investors. My conclusion is that a tax policy change is needed. 
First, private investors who participate in SIB investments are subject to 
unnecessary compliance risks. Tax compliance risks arise because the federal income tax 
consequences to investors who participate in SIB investments are unclear under current 
law. Given this ambiguity, SIB investors may find it difficult to confidently compute and 
assess their tax liability. Modifying the tax law would provide investors with additional 
guidance in this area, thereby minimizing tax uncertainty, taxpayer audit risks, and any 
accompanying deterrent effects.  
Second, SIB investors most likely do not benefit from tax preferences that are 
extended to comparable investments. For instance, traditional stock investments share 
many economic features with SIB investments, but are taxed at preferential rates and 
generally only subject to tax at the time at which the investment is disposed. On the other 
hand, SIB investments are likely to give rise to lower rates of return that are subject to tax 
at higher non-preferential tax rates throughout the term of the investment. Municipal 
bonds are also similar in many respects to SIBs in terms of their goals and rate of return, 
but unlike SIBs, these bonds are generally exempt from taxation. Thus, SIB investors 
face an additional tax burden relative to other investors. This high tax cost is likely to dis-
incentivize large-scale private investment in SIBs despite the potential of SIBs to 
improve the social service system in the United States or at least move us toward a more 
evidence-based, collaborative delivery of social services.  
Lastly, these tax policies, together with the currently relatively low rate of return 
on risky SIB investments, significantly impact the availability of the private capital 
required for SIB investments to achieve their goals. However, there is no sound policy 
basis for these distinctions. Thus, the unfavorable tax treatment of SIB investments 
unjustifiably increases administrative complexity, distorts investment decisions, and 
creates inequities among similarly situated investors. Given these negative policy 
implications, the government should create a more favorable regulatory environment that 
does not deter private investments in SIBs.10 
In short, this Article proposes several potential tax policy solutions to minimize 
the current tax burdens imposed on private SIB investors. The tax policy options include 
subjecting the SIB investment earnings to preferential tax treatment, exempting the 
earnings from taxation, or granting investors a deduction for income tax purposes at the 
                                                      
9 See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
10 To prevent the current tax law from hindering the development of SIBs in the United States, 
legislative or regulatory action is also needed to address the current limitations on investments by non-profit 
organizations and private foundations. A discussion of the necessary changes to encourage investments by 
these entities is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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time they make a SIB investment. Each alternative would minimize some of the deterrent 
effects that the tax law currently imposes on SIB investments by treating these 
investments more in parity with similar investments. As a result, these changes would 
mitigate some of the risk that investors assume when they invest in these speculative 
financial instruments and enable SIBs to compete more fairly for a share of private 
capital. 
Part I describes the emergence of this new social financing instrument and its 
potential to revolutionize how we fund social services as well as its limitations. Part II 
explains the current tax treatment of SIB investments and illustrates how the current state 
of the law treats private SIB investments unfavorably relative to other investments. Part 
III argues that changes to tax policy are needed to prevent the unintended discriminatory 
tax treatment towards SIB investments and to promote sound tax policy. Finally, Part IV 
discusses several ways this change could be accomplished. By clarifying the tax 
treatment of SIBs and removing unnecessary tax barriers to SIB investments, private 
participation in this innovative financing mechanism is likely to increase and allow SIBs 
the opportunity to live up to their potential. 
 
II. A NEW FINANCING MECHANISM 
This Part describes what SIBs are, their growth, and their current status. It then 
analyzes the benefits and shortcomings of using SIBs to finance social programs and 
concludes that if adequately structured and regulated, SIBs have the potential to provide 
an alternative source of financing to address some of society’s long-lasting social 
challenges. 
 
A. The Concept of a SIB 
A SIB, also referred to as a pay-for-success contract, is a multi-stakeholder 
arrangement, in which private investors provide the upfront capital to fund social 
services, with the government repaying investors only if certain social outcomes are 
achieved.11 In a traditional SIB model, a government agency identifies a social issue that 
it wants to address, such as homelessness, criminal justice, public health, or preschool 
education.12 It then enters into an agreement with an intermediary organization.13 The 
intermediary organization both raises the funds from private investors to finance a multi-
year social program to address the identified social issue and selects and manages the 
                                                      
11 An Overview of Social Impact Bonds in the United States, SOC. IMPACT ARCHITECTS (Oct. 6, 
2015), http://socialimpactarchitects.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Overview-of-Social-Impact-Bonds-
100615.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GZS-2W97]; MCKINSEY & CO., From Potential to Action: Bringing Social 
Impact Bonds to the U.S., 4 (May 2012), http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-
Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_Bonds_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK64-EPH6]. 
A SIB does not have a precise, uniform definition because there are numerous variations of the SIB 
model. However, the features discussed above are common in most existing SIB structures. See Mazur, supra 
note 7, at 436–41. See Appendix A for diagram of a traditional SIB structure.  
12 See Mazur, supra note 7, at 437; SOC. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 11. 
13 See Mazur, supra note 7; SOC. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 11; Emilie Goodall, Choosing 
Social Impact Bonds: A Practitioner’s Guide, BRIDGES IMPACT+, 13 (2014), 
http://www.bridgesfundmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Bridges-Choosing-Social-Impact-
Bonds-A-Practitioner’s-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM43-Y25E]. 
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service providers that implement the program.14 After a specified period of time, if the 
project meets or exceeds pre-determined project outcome metrics, as verified by an 
independent evaluator, the government pays the investors, through the intermediary, their 
original investment plus a potential return on investment.15 The return on investment 
depends on the outcomes achieved, with the maximum return capped at a contractually 
agreed-to value. This amount is often calculated based on the projected government 
savings resulting from a successful program.16 However, if the program is unsuccessful in 
producing specific social outcomes, the government does not pay for the social services 
and the investor loses his or her entire investment.17 
The creation of this new financing mechanism was prompted by the need to 
increase the pool of capital available to finance social programs and to do so with 
minimal cost to taxpayers.18 Specifically, the founders sought to find a solution to “the 
challenge of financing social action programs, with a specific focus on prevention and 
early intervention.”19  SIBs offer the promise of enabling proven and evidence-based 
programs to scale, creating cost-savings for governments, and encouraging innovation in 
the social sector, while shifting the political and financial risks of failure to the private 
sector.20 These promised benefits have sparked a lot of interest in SIBs worldwide. 
 
B. The Current Status of SIBs 
In 2010, the United Kingdom originated and launched the first SIB.21 Since then, 
SIBs have become a worldwide phenomenon. Numerous SIBs have been launched in the 
United States and across the world and many more SIBs are under development.22 
                                                      
14 See Mazur, supra note 7, at 436–37; Cox, supra note 7, at 965–66; Emily Gustafsson-Wright & 
Sophie Gardiner, Policy Recommendations for the Applications of Impact Bonds, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SIB20Policy20Brief201web-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BF62-892P]; Goodall, supra note 13, at 20. However, this role may also be performed by 
two separate parties. Mazur, supra note 7, at 440. 
15 See NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, Financing and Social Impact Bonds, 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn/basics/#pay-for-success-financial-and-social-impact-bonds (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XH45-JSGT]; Adriana Barajas et al., Social Impact Bonds: A New Tool for 
Social Financing, PRINCETON UNIV. PUB. POLICY & INT’L AFFAIRS PROGRAM, 14 (2014), 
https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/Social%20Impact%20Bonds%202014%20Final%20Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MMG-3CZB].  
16 See Lisa Barclay & Tom Symons, A Technical Guide to Developing Social Impact Bonds, 
SOCIAL FIN. (Jan. 2013), http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Technical-Guide-to-
Developing-Social-Impact-Bonds1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESB7-9KR7]; SOC. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 
11. 
17 MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 11. 
18 See David Butler, Dan Bloom & Timothy Rudd, Using Social Impact Bonds to Spur Innovation, 
Knowledge Building, and Accountability, 9 CMTY. DEV. INV. REV. 53 (2013); Cox, supra note 7, at 965.   
19 Max Liang, Brian Mansberger & Andrew C. Spieler, An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. 
INT’L BUS. & L. 267, 268 (2014) (noting that The Council on Social Action, a UK think tank, came up with 
the idea for a SIB). 
20 Id.  
21 This SIB was launched with the aim of cutting the rate of recidivism at Peterborough Prison. See 
Butler, Bloom & Rudd, supra note 18, at 57; Cox, supra note 7, at 962. Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra 
note 19, at 269.  
22 See SOC. ENTERPRISE GREENHOUSE, Social Impact Bonds Fact Sheet, http://segreenhouse.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/SIB-Fact-Sheet_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9GY-QCPM]; Goodall, supra note 13; 
Laura Tyson & Lenny Mendonca, Doing Well by Doing Good, TIMES OF OMAN (Jan. 29, 2016), 
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Currently, the United States has more SIBs under development than any other 
country.23 One factor that has contributed to the growth of SIBs in the United States is 
that numerous groups have supported the development of SIBs. For instance, 
philanthropic organizations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies have helped launch some of the earliest SIBs by guaranteeing a portion of 
the investors’ funds.24 Philanthropic foundations have also fostered SIBs by providing 
grants to finance pro bono assistance to help implement SIBs. 25  Major financial 
institutions, like Goldman Sachs, have invested capital in SIB-funded programs, 
indicating their belief in the potential of SIBs to deliver effective social services. 26 
Moreover, groups have formed, such as the Harvard Kennedy School Social Impact Bond 
Technical Assistance Lab and the Sorenson Impact Center at the University of Utah, to 
assist in the development of SIBs and to foster social innovation through research, 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://timesofoman.com/article/76393/Opinion/Columnist/The-United-States-is-already-the-largest-pay-for-
success-market-in-the-world [https://perma.cc/3KLZ-PRBG]; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
As of June 2016, more than 65 SIB projects were at different phases of development across the 
United States and, as of February 2017, 15 SIB projects have been launched in the United States. Sindhu 
Lakshmanan, Pay for Success: To Invest or Not to Invest?, LIVING CITIES (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.livingcities.org/blog/1129-pay-for-success-to-invest-or-not-to-invest [https://perma.cc/8S56-
UD4T]; Social Impact Bonds 101, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., 
http://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/siblab/files/sibs_101_hks_gpl_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA63-VGVC]. 
SIBs have also been implemented abroad in countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Pakistan, India, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Rwanda, and Mozambique, among others. Esha 
Chhabra, The ‘It Girl’ of Muni Finance: Are Social Impact Bonds a Fad or a Long-Term Solution for 
Underfunded Public Programs?, NEXTCITY (Jun. 23, 2014), https://nextcity.org/features/view/social-impact-
bonds-public-private-solution-social-problems-cities [https://perma.cc/8288-K2SY]; John Hartley, Social 
Impact Bonds are Going Mainstream, FORBES (Sep. 15, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/09/15/social-impact-bonds-are-going-
mainstream/#17ad409217d5 [https://perma.cc/UDH4-PCE5]. 
23 Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22. 
24 See, e.g., Fact Sheet – Investing in What Works: “Pay for Success” in New York State Increasing 
Employment and Improving Public Safety (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/pfsfactsheet_0314_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T8UE-V68J] [hereinafter State of NY Fact Sheet] (providing that Rockefeller Foundation 
has provided a first-loss guarantee of up to $1.3 million to investors in the New York State’s SIB); Press 
Release, Office of the Mayor, City of New York, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs And Corrections 
Commissioner Schriro Announce Nation’s First Social Impact Bond Program (Aug. 2, 2012),  
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/285-12/mayor-bloomberg-deputy-mayor-gibbs-corrections-
commissioner-schriro-nation-s-first#/0 [https://perma.cc/97WT-44Z8] (describing Bloomberg Philanthropies’ 
guarantee to protect up to $7.2 million of investor principal). 
25 See, e.g., Ashley Pettus, Pay for Progress: Social Impact Bonds, HARV. MAG. (Jul. –Aug. 2013), 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/07/social-impact-bonds [https://perma.cc/C6FT-Z3FC] (describing how the 
Rockefeller Foundation funds the Harvard Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab, which helps 
provide governments with technical assistance in developing and launching a SIB-funded program); GOV’T 
PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 5 (noting that The Government Performance Lab receives financial 
support from multiple philanthropic organizations including Bloomberg Philanthropies, The Corporation for 
National and Community Service Social Innovation Fund, the Dunham Fund, the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, the Pritzker Children’s Initiative, and the Rockefeller Foundation). 
26 See, e.g., Office of the Mayor, City of New York, supra note 24 (listing Goldman Sachs as the 
primary investor in the SIB-funded program); GOLDMAN SACHS, Fact Sheet: The Massachusetts Juvenile 
Justice Pay for Success Initiative, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/trends-in-our-
business/massachusetts-social-impact-bond/MA-juvenile-justice-pay-for-success-initiative.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3CD-U2BN] (indicating that Goldman Sachs provided $9 million in senior loan financing 
through its Social Impact Fund); State of NY Fact Sheet, supra note 24 (noting that the project raised the 
majority of its funds from the clients of Bank of America Merrill Lynch). 
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advisory, and educational work in understanding and improving the SIB model.27  In 
addition, community groups, policy experts and leading economists have also supported 
the development of SIBs in the United States in various other ways.28 
The federal government has also played a big role in promoting SIBs in the 
United States. SIBs have received bipartisan support from politicians. For instance, in 
June 2016, the House of Representatives unanimously passed legislation to increase 
federal funding for the creation of SIBs by state and local governments in order to 
encourage the creation of public-private partnerships and thereby increase the 
effectiveness of social programs in the United States.29 Although the Senate did not pass 
the legislation before the end of Congress, a similar bill was introduced in the House of 
Representatives on January 2017.30 Additionally, financial support has come from several 
federal agencies including the Social Innovation Fund,31 which is planning to provide 
more than $13 million in funding for promising SIB projects.32 Similarly, other federal 
agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Labor, have provided grants to government 
agencies to help finance any outcome payments to investors of a successful SIB-funded 
program.33 Several states have also supported SIBs by advancing legislation to facilitate 
the exploration and testing of SIBs.34 
                                                      
27 See Pettus, supra note 25; GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22 (describing the Harvard 
Kennedy School’s Government Performance Lab’s participation in the majority of the SIB projects launched 
in the United States to date); Mission, UNIV. OF UTAH SORENSON IMPACT CENTER, 
http://sorensonimpact.com/mission/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EX22-NLPK]. 
28 See Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22, at 1; John Hartley, Social Impact Bonds are Going 
Mainstream, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2014/09/15/social-impact-
bonds-are-going-mainstream/#17ad409217d5.; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
29 Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for Results Act, H.R. 5170, 114th Cong. (2016). However, 
because the legislation was not passed by the Senate by the end of Congress, the legislation was not enacted. 
Similarly, a separate bill that involves pay for success initiatives in education was also introduced and 
enacted in the Senate in 2015. Every Student Succeeds Act, S. 1177, 114th Cong. (2015).  
30 Social Impact Partnerships to Pay for Results Act, H.R. 576, 115th Cong. (2017) (described as, a 
bill “[t]o encourage and support partnerships between the public and private sectors to improve our Nation’s 
social programs, and for other purposes.”). 
31 SIF Classic, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., https://www.nationalservice.gov/programs/social-
innovation-fund/our-programs/classic [perma.cc/PS9S-B3WD]. The Social Innovation Fund was authorized 
by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act as a federal grant-making initiative of the Corporation for 
National and Community Service that is intended to support “the growth of effective programs to have 
greater impact, as well as the development of innovative approaches to address the most challenging social 
problems.” About the Social Innovation Fund, CORP. FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV., 
https://www.nationalservice.gov/programs/social-innovation-fund (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/2EGA-YQP3]. 
32 Federal Agency Announces $13 Million in Funding to Support Pay for Success Projects, CORP. 
FOR NAT’L & CMTY. SERV. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nationalservice.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2016/federal-agency-announces-13-million-funding-support-pay-success (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) 
[perma.cc/2JBK-4M2D]. 
33 See, e.g., Pay for Success Intermediary Agreement between New York State Department of 
Labor, Social Finance, Inc. and Social Finance NY State Workforce Re-Entry 2013 Manager, Inc. (Oct. 1, 
2013), https://www.budget.ny.gov/contract/ICPFS/PFSMainAgreement_Sched_0314.pdf (providing that the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration would award the New York State 
government a grant of up to $12,000,000 to help pay for any outcome payments the state owes investors if 
the project is successful). GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 26 (describing how the U.S. Department of Labor 
awarded the Commonwealth of Massachusetts a grant of $11.7 million to help fund any success payments 
resulting from the SIB-funded initiative). See Alex Goldmark, The Most Exciting 0.003% of Obama’s 
Budget: Social Impact Bonds, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.fastcompany.com/1728321/the-
most-exciting-00003-of-obama-s-budget-social-impact-bonds [perma.cc/VX3P-7EF8]. In addition, the 
2017]  SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 149 
Despite the foregoing, private investors have not responded as quickly to the 
promise of SIBs.35 However, sufficient private capital is critical for SIBs to have a chance 
to fully succeed. As further discussed below, the current tax law may be one factor 
deterring these potential investors.36 
 
C. The Potential of SIBs 
SIBs have tremendous potential to help tackle some of society’s toughest social 
problems. At a time when most non-profits are underfunded, the SIB structure brings 
together public and private actors in a manner that encourages an increase in funding for 
social service projects by private investors and a more efficient and effective use of that 
capital. In particular, SIBs unlock an additional source of capital, promote innovation, 
encourage interagency cooperation and create more accountability, which together can 
result in a more effective and efficient service model than the traditional manner in which 
social services are funded and implemented in the United States.37 
For instance, the SIB structure incentivizes private investors to help finance 
social programs by promising both a social and financial return on the investor’s 
investment. 38  Social service providers no longer have to solely rely on government 
funding and philanthropic donations and grants to fund programs, but rather acquire an 
additional source of capital to fund programs that otherwise might be too expensive to 
implement.39 In addition, service providers receive this capital upfront, which protects 
them from unpredictable government budget cuts or a decline in charitable donations.40 
This, in turn, helps service providers scale successful programs and make a greater social 
impact.41 
                                                                                                                                                   
former administration also aimed to support the advancement and testing of SIBs by allocating funds in its 
budget proposal specifically for this purpose.  
34 See Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy, AM. FORWARD 
(May 2, 2016), http://www.americaforward.org/state-of-play-pay-for-success-and-evidence-based-policy-
aprilmay-2016/ [perma.cc/ZJP8-W6Q4]. 
35 Ron Davies, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., Social Impact Bonds: Private 
Finance That Generates Social Returns (Aug. 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/538223-Social-
impact-bonds-FINAL.pdf. 
36 See infra Part II. 
37 See Valerie Dao et al., UNIV. OF CHICAGO HARRIS SCH. OF PUB. POLICY, Social Impact Bonds: A 
Feasibility Analysis of the Wyman Teen Outreach Program, 
http://128.135.46.110/sites/default/files/practica/spring2012-report2.pdf [perma.cc/9LQU-VTTU]; What is a 
Social Impact Bond?, SOC. FIN. (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://www.socialfinanceus.org/print/491; Cox, 
supra note 7, at 967. 
The traditional model for delivering social services focuses on inputs or outputs, rather than 
outcomes or results. Cox, supra note 7, at 968; Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22, at 1. As described by one 
commentator, “A traditional social program is usually judged by volume of services provided, such as the 
number of people trained or homeless people sheltered. By contrast, in a pay-for-success model, the returns 
are based on the social benefits achieved or savings reaped by government.” Id. at 1–2. 
38 See Pettus, supra note 25; Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 273; Barajas et al., 
supra note 15, at 17; Goodall, supra note 13, at 9; Davies, supra note 35.  
39 See Chhabra, supra note 22, at 3. 
40 See Peter G. Dagher, Jr., Note, Social Impact Bonds and the Private Benefit Doctrine: Will 
Participation Jeopardize a Nonprofit’s Tax-Exempt Status?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3479, 3504 (2013); Cox, 
supra note 7. 
41 See Cox, supra note 7, at 970; State of NY Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
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Moreover, by having private investors, rather than the government, provide the 
upfront investment capital, the government effectively shifts the performance and 
financial risks of funding certain social service activities to the private sector.42 Given 
that private investors generally have a higher risk tolerance than government agencies, 
this shift encourages the pursuit of new and creative methods to solve complex social 
problems and allows for innovation in the public sector.43 Because ineffective programs 
cost the government and taxpayers nothing, the SIB structure also provides governments 
with a risk-free way to implement these new interventions and de-politicizes the funding 
process so that governments can address issues that are politically unattractive or 
expensive.44 “The aim of the investor for higher returns and requirement that service 
providers deliver efficient and effect[ive] interventions is what drives further 
innovation.”45  
In addition, by tying repayment to outcomes, the SIB structure gives service 
providers flexibility to experiment with different strategies instead of requiring them to 
focus on specified inputs or the volume of services provided. This allows governments to 
purchase social results (e.g., increase in employment) rather than social services (e.g., job 
training) that may not achieve desired results, thus enabling more effective and efficient 
use of taxpayer dollars.46 This type of outcomes-focused arrangement also provides a 
method and incentive for multiple service providers to work together to achieve a 
common goal with the project intermediary overseeing and coordinating the multiple 
parties. 47  Similarly, this structure encourages different government agencies to work 
together to accomplish a broader goal, because SIB-financed programs often result in 
savings across agencies.48 Thus, SIBs have the potential to help overcome government 
silos and maximize the impact of various social programs.49 
The SIB structure also incentivizes service providers to invest in preventative 
programs, rather than more costly remedial programs.50  Traditionally, governments tend 
to prefer remedial programs because of the timing discrepancy between cost and savings 
inherent in preventative programs.51 But SIBs change this result because preventative 
programs are often more effective at achieving the desired project outcome. 52 
Preventative programs also have the added benefit of reducing long-term government 
spending because they tackle the root cause of a social problem, which creates public 
savings even after the duration of the SIB-funded project has terminated.53 
                                                      
42 See Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 274; Davies, supra note 35, at 5; State of NY 
Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
43 See Chhabra, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that “[i]nvestor dollars provided through SIBs do [not] 
have the limitations of project grants or government dollars; they offer a new freedom.”); Kohli, Besharov & 
Costa, supra note 7; Goodall, supra note 13, at 7.  
44 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 12, 17; Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 273; 
Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 1, 6. 
45 Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 272. 
46 See Cox, supra note 7, at 968; Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22. 
47 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 17; Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7. 
48 Pettus, supra note 25. 
49 Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 6. 
50 See SOC. IMPACT ARCHITECTS, supra note 11; Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 2. 
51 Cox, supra note 7, at 968. 
52 See id. (recognizing that government authorities “have little political or financial incentive to 
invest in prevention [initiatives]”). 
53 See Goodall, supra note 13, at 8. 
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Finally, the SIB service model also creates more accountability in the social 
services space, which further contributes to the creation of more effective social 
programs. 54  Specifically, by requiring outcomes to be measured, SIBs expand our 
knowledge about what programs are effective and what programs are ineffective at 
addressing certain social challenges. It allows for more evidence-based decision making 
in the social service sector. This also improves government accountability by 
incentivizing governments to shift funding from ineffective programs towards those that 
work well.55  Moreover, because the investors’ return depends on the success of the 
program, investors are financially incentivized to only support programs that they believe 
will be effective, rather than programs chosen because of the service provider’s political 
ties.56 To manage their risk, private investors often also contribute their financial or 
managerial expertise in performing due diligence and require certain quality controls to 
be implemented.57 The service providers also have an interest in providing an effective 
social intervention, because they are often rewarded with a success fee if they reach 
certain performance thresholds. Service providers that can show that they use any money 
received to successfully achieve a positive social impact are more likely to attract 
additional capital to that organization. 58  "By implementing and using a performance 
management (measurement) system, organizations can measure, report, learn, improve, 
and demonstrate … [the] positive change they are making in the lives of the people they 
serve."59 
Thus, the SIB structure brings together multiple stakeholders, who each have an 
interest in achieving a common goal and who each have something different to 
contribute. This cross-sector collaboration has the potential to make SIB-funded 
programs operate more effectively and efficiently. 
 
D. The Limitations of SIBs 
Despite these benefits, SIBs are not a panacea and have limitations as well as 
opponents. For instance, one of the most challenging features of a SIB is the requirement 
to define and measure social outcomes.60 Although this feature is beneficial in providing 
the government, the public, and the non-profit sector with valuable information about 
which programs work and which do not, this feature makes SIBs not suitable to address 
every social issue. Accordingly, SIBs should only be used to finance programs that are 
capable of objective measurement and assessment, such as addressing homelessness, the 
                                                      
54 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 17. 
55 See Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that without this publicly available 
knowledge, governments find it difficult to shift money away from current programs, even if they are 
ineffective at addressing the problem at hand). 
56 See Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 272. 
57 See id.; Davies, supra note 35, at 5 (noting that “involving investors who are knowledgeable and 
experienced in business brings new rigor and discipline to the supply of social services”); THIRD SECTOR 
CAPITAL PARTNERS, Pay for Success/Social Impact Bonds: RFI 1, 3, 5 (June 20, 2011) (on file with author). 
58 See Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 272; THIRD SECTOR CAPITAL PARTNERS, 
supra note 57, at 3. 
59 SOC. IMPACT RES., Root Cause, Improving Nonprofit Performance 7 (2012), 
http://www.rootcause.org/docs/Resources/Publications/SIR2012-Performance-Management-Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3H3G-RYMX]. 
60 See Davies, supra note 35, at 6 (recognizing that measuring social outcomes is difficult 
especially ensuring a direct correlation between the intervention and the result); Kohli, Besharov & Costa, 
supra note 7. 
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rate of recidivism, childhood education, unemployment, or preventative health care.61 
However, as information technology continues to evolve, it will become easier to capture 
administrative data with respect to certain outcomes that can provide us with thorough 
and reliable measures of social impact.62 
Moreover, as with any pay-for-success contract that ties payments to results, 
there is the risk of the parties manipulating results to maximize payments.63 SIBs help 
minimize some of this risk by focusing on social outcomes rather than inputs or outputs. 
Rewarding inputs and outputs creates the wrong incentives by encouraging service 
providers to pursue more cost-effective methods to increase the volume of these inputs or 
outputs, irrespective of its actual social impact.64 Also, it is often easier to manipulate 
inputs, such as the number of people enrolled in a job-training course, or outputs, such as 
the number of job training certificates received. 65  But it may be more difficult to 
manipulate outcomes, such as an increase in the employment rate. 66  SIBs further 
minimize any potential gaming of the system by requiring an independent evaluator 
and/or verifier to measure and determine whether the desired outcomes have been 
achieved as a result of the SIB-financed program. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that SIBs are not immune from these types of concerns. Thus, the evaluation must be 
rigorously performed by independent expert evaluators, with a strong focus on 
counterfactuals and a power to audit. In addition, the stakeholders must be excluded from 
the evaluation process. Government regulation is also necessary to minimize collusion 
between the different SIB parties.67 
Another potential limitation is the cost of implementing a SIB-financed program. 
Due to the infancy of the SIB model, the multiple parties involved, and the complexity of 
identifying and measuring performance outcomes, SIBs are costly to set up.68 Therefore, 
SIBs are best suited for projects that can generate enough cost savings to overcome these 
additional expenses.69 For instance, large-scale projects may be preferable, because the 
increased economies of scale can help lower the costs of the program and administrative 
expenses.70  As SIBs become a more popular form of financing social projects, it is 
possible that implementing these projects will become more standardized and less 
costly.71 
                                                      
61 See Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 2. 
62 THIRD SECTOR CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 57, at 3. 
63 This is a result of Campbell’s Law: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social 
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and 
corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” Jon Pratt, Flaws in the Social Impact Bond/Pay for 
Success Craze, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (Apr. 17, 2013, 2:01 PM), 
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KYCJ]. 
64 Cox, supra note 7, at 968–69.  
65 See Id. at 968; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 10. 
66 See Cox, supra note 7, at 968; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 10. 
67 See Cox, supra note 7, at 977; Davies, supra note 35, at 7; THIRD SECTOR CAPITAL PARTNERS, 
supra note 57, at 6. 
68 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 18; Jessica Toonkel, CORRECTED-Wall Street Not Giving 
Up on U.S. Social Impact Bonds, REUTERS (Jul. 29, 2015, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/29/usa-socialbonds-idUSL1N1082S820150729 
[https://perma.cc/3Z7Q-Z6CT]. 
69 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 18. 
70 Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19, at 274; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 18. 
71 See Toonkel, supra note 68. 
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Finally, at this point, it is unclear whether or not SIBs will live up to their 
potential. To assess their potential accurately, more evidence is necessary. As of February 
2017, only three SIBs launched in the United States have been operating for long enough 
to have their outcomes evaluated and any success payments calculated.72 Of these three, 
one project was terminated early because the program was unsuccessful in reaching its 
goal of reducing the recidivism rate at Rikers Island.73 The second one, the Utah High 
Quality Preschool Program, resulted in a success payment, but the success metrics used 
to evaluate the results of the program, designed to help at risk kindergarteners, were 
questionable.74 This generated a lot of criticism of the program.75 Most recently, the third 
project resulted in an initial success payment to private investors of a SIB aimed at 
expanding high quality pre-school education to low-income children.76 Although it is too 
early to evaluate the true success of Chicago’s SIB project, some of the evaluation design 
issues with the Utah program have been addressed in this project.  
Despite setbacks, these early projects do not necessarily diminish from the 
potential of SIBs to address social challenges. On the one hand, the SIB model is not 
structured to guarantee success, but rather to shift the risk of innovating to private 
investors.77 Thus, the failure of the Rikers Island project to reach its goal of reducing the 
rate of recidivism has the benefit of using private funds to demonstrate a type of program 
that is ineffective. Similarly, the controversial results of the Utah program reveal the type 
of evaluation methodologies that do not work, and reinforce that the SIB model is not 
suitable for all projects. As one commentator has noted, “[f]ailed efforts are not only 
inevitable, they are essential to finding real solutions.”78 On the other hand, regardless of 
                                                      
72 See GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4. These projects are: (i) New York City’s SIB-
funded program aimed at reducing the recidivism rate among juveniles detained at Rikers Island, which was 
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education to at-need students. See Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel 
Announces Expansion of Pre-K to More Than 2,600 Chicago Public School Children (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2014/oct/mayor-emanuel-
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(describing the program and results of the New York City SIB targeting recidivism). 
73 See John Olson & Andrea Phillips, Rikers Island: The First Social Impact Bond in the United 
States, 9 COMMUNITY DEV. INV. REV. 97, 97 (2013); GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4. 
74 See GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4; Nathaniel Popper, Did Goldman Make the 
Grade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, B1. 
75 See GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4; Popper, supra note 74. 
76 See GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4; Melissa Sanchez, Investors Earn Max Initial 
Payment from Chicago’s ‘Social Impact Bond’, CHI. REP. (May 16, 2016), 
http://chicagoreporter.com/investors-earn-max-initial-payment-from-chicagos-social-impact-bond/ 
[https://perma.cc/KMG8-ERBE]. 
77 See GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB., supra note 22, at 4 (“The early U.S. PFS projects have 
demonstrated the model’s potential to increase resources dedicated to tackling challenging social problems, 
while simultaneously minimizing the risk that ineffective programs continue to receive funding year after 
year.”); Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22. 
78 Tyson & Mendonca, supra note 22, at 2. 
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success, the SIB model has the potential to increase funding for social programs and 
encourage evidence-based decision-making.79 
In sum, a SIB-financed program is not appropriate to address all social issues.80 
But as already recognized, “where viable … they present many advantages over 
traditional grant and appropriation financing.” 81  Thus, if appropriate precautions are 
taken to minimize collusion or corruptive practices, SIB-financed programs could make a 
substantial impact on many of the challenging social issues our nation faces.82 However, 
a sufficient number of SIBs need to be implemented and evaluated before we can 
conclude whether or not SIBs can fulfill their goal of improving the delivery of social 
services. 
 
III. TAXATION OF SIBS 
This Part discusses the current tax treatment of SIBs for U.S. federal income tax 
purposes. 83  Section A briefly explains why the federal income tax consequences to 
investors who participate in a SIB-funded program are unclear under existing law. 
Section B demonstrates that the current law does not treat SIBs as a tax-favored 
investment. In particular, it discusses why SIB investments most likely do not benefit 
from preferential tax rates, tax-exempt treatment, or an upfront charitable contribution 
deduction. 
 
A. Tax Uncertainty 
 Because the taxation of SIB investments is not specifically addressed by existing 
federal income tax laws, their current tax treatment must be discerned from the general 
rules governing financial instruments. Under existing law, the tax implications of an 
investment in a financial instrument significantly depend on how the instrument is 
characterized for tax purposes.84 Courts generally weigh numerous factors in determining 
an instrument’s characterization.85 Under this facts and circumstances analysis, SIBs can 
                                                      
79 See Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 17; GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, supra note 22, at 4. 
80 Davies, supra note 35, at 6; Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 8.  
81 Cox, supra note 7, at 970. 
82 See Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7, at 8. 
83 For a detailed discussion of the tax consequences to investors who participate in a SIB-funded 
program, see Mazur, supra note 7, at 468–486. 
84 See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON 
TAX’N, JCS-3-13, REP. TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON PRESENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS 
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(2011); Edward D. Kleinbard & Erika W. Nijenhuis, Everything I Know about New Financial Products I 
Learned from DECS, 553 PLI/Tax 491 (2002); Michael S. Farber, Equity, Debt, Not—The Tax Treatment of 
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85 The characterization of a financial instrument requires the consideration of numerous factors, 
such as (i) the parties’ intent, (ii) the existence of an unconditional promise to pay at a fixed maturity date; 
(iii) the provision of fixed interest rates; (iv) participation in profits; (v) the adequacy of the interest; (vi) the 
source of payments (vii) participation in management; (viii) the extent of subordination to the claims of 
general creditors; (ix) the identity of interest between holders of the instrument and owners; (x) satisfaction of 
the independent creditor test; and (xi) the use of the funds. See I.R.C. § 358(a); Roth Steel Tube Co. v. 
Comm’r, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Estate of Mixon, Jr. v. United 
States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972); Fin Hay Realty, supra note 84; STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-
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plausibly be characterized in several different ways.86 This uncertainty exposes a private 
SIB investor to tax compliance risks, as well as to an unpredictable tax liability.  
For instance, the tax law may treat SIBs as debt instruments. SIBs are referred to 
as “bonds” and the majority of U.S. SIB arrangements indicate that the parties intend that 
the instrument be treated as debt.87 In addition, several other factors may also weigh in 
favor of debt characterization. Specifically, the rate of return set forth in a typical SIB 
arrangement is likely considered a “reasonable” rate of return, thereby supporting debt 
characterization. The source of repayment also suggests a SIB arrangement is akin to debt 
because a state or local government generally guarantees the intermediary’s payments to 
investors upon a successful outcome.88 Moreover, the payment preference, which SIB 
investors often receive over other claimants, likely also favors debt characterization.89 
Finally, several other factors are inconclusive and do not preclude debt characterization, 
such as the provision of a fixed rate of interest whose payment is contingent on the 
success of the project, or weigh only slightly in favor of debt characterization, such as the 
limited rights of SIB investors to participate in management.90 
Alternatively, current law may also treat SIBs as equity.91 Two factors potentially 
weigh in favor of equity characterization. First, a traditional SIB arrangement does not 
necessarily provide an unconditional promise to pay the principal at a fixed maturity date, 
which is a significant factor in the debt/equity characterization analysis.92 On the one 
hand, the SIB investment provides for a fixed maturity date. On the other hand, 
repayment is contingent on the program’s successful delivery of social outcomes, which 
undermines the requirement that payment is unconditional. Thus, this factor may point 
towards an equity characterization.93 Second, SIB investors participate in the profits of 
the enterprise, which is another factor that favors equity characterization.94 Specifically, 
SIB investors stand to gain an additional return on their investment to the extent the SIB-
funded program exceeds pre-determined outcome metrics.95 Generally, the amount of 
these “success payments” is based on the cost-savings the program accrues to the 
government that initiated the SIB project.96 However, SIBs generally also cap the profit 
potential of the SIB investor and the profit participation is not discretionary once the 
                                                                                                                                                   
3-13, supra note 84, at 58; STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-41-11, supra note 84; I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 
1994-1 C.B. 357; Farber, supra note 84, at 645. 
86 For a detailed analysis of how SIBs are likely characterized for tax purposes under current law, 
see Mazur, supra note 7, at 446–66. 
87 See, e.g., Olson & Phillips, supra note 73 (describing the investment structure as a multiple draw 
term loan to the project intermediary); Pay for Success Contract Among the Commonwealth of Mass., 
ROCA, Inc., and Youth Servs. Inc. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.thirdsectorcap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/final-pay-for-success-contract-executed-1-7-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/34KL-
LLB8] (referring to the financing of a SIB launched in Massachussets to target juvenile rescidivism as a 
loan).  
88 See Mazur, supra note 7, at 453. 
89 See id. at 454. 
90 See id. at 453. 
91 If a SIB arrangement is treated as creating an equity interest, it may result in the creation of a 
corporate equity interest or a partnership interest or joint venture. See id. at 457. 
92 See id. at 449. 
93 See id. 
94 See William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical 
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 442 (1970); Mazur, supra note 7, at 451. 
95 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
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performance thresholds are met. Thus, although this factor potentially suggests equity 
characterization, it does not definitively preclude debt characterization.97 
It is also possible that a SIB arrangement is characterized as neither debt nor 
equity, but rather as a derivative instrument. A SIB arrangement has several important 
features in common with derivative instruments, in general, and more specifically with 
notional principal contracts. Both SIB arrangements and derivative instruments seek to 
shift financial risks to another party.98 Both instruments also calculate payments based on 
the value of an underlying transaction. 99  In addition, like prepaid swaps, a type of 
notional principal contract, SIBs also require one party to pay a fixed amount upfront, 
while the other party is contractually obligated to make variable future payments, which 
are calculated based on the value of the underlying transaction at a particular date.100 
To summarize, a traditional SIB arrangement can arguably be treated as debt, 
equity or a derivative instrument. There are factors that support each of these 
characterizations. Taxpayers and the Service may disagree as to the correct treatment for 
tax purposes, thereby affecting a SIB investor’s ultimate tax liability. Moreover, SIBs are 
not structured uniformly. Certain modifications may change the tax classification, and as 
SIBs continue to evolve, the characterization analysis also may lead to different results. 
 
B. Unavailable Tax Preferences 
The tax preferences that the federal government currently extends to traditional 
equity investments, municipal bonds, and charitable donations likely do not apply to 
traditional SIB investments. As a result, private investors who participate in SIBs do not 
currently enjoy tax benefits, such as preferential tax rates, tax-exempt treatment, or an 
upfront deduction. 
 
1. Preferential Tax Rates 
In general, qualified dividends and capital gains are subject to preferential tax 
treatment.101 These forms of income are subject to tax at a maximum rate of 20%,102 
rather than the 39.6% tax rate imposed on other forms of income.103 Even though a SIB 
arrangement may be treated as an equity interest under certain circumstances, a 
traditional SIB arrangement would most likely not be treated as equity for tax 
purposes.104 Accordingly, income generated by a SIB investment would not benefit from 
these preferential tax rates. 
                                                      
97 See Mazur, supra note 7, at 451. 
98 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 
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A traditional SIB arrangement is more likely characterized as a contingent debt 
instrument under the existing law. 105  This characterization is especially likely in 
situations where the parties label the SIB investment as a “loan” and/or issue a note or 
other evidence of indebtedness.106 Moreover, as discussed above, the factors that weigh in 
favor of characterizing a SIB investment as equity, such as the unconditional promise to 
pay at a fixed maturity date and the SIB investor’s participation in profits do not preclude 
debt characterization in all cases.107 
As a debt instrument, the SIB investment would likely be subject to the non-
contingent bond method.108 Pursuant to this method, the SIB investment will give rise to 
interest income, which will be calculated and taxable on an annual basis, even prior to 
any payments being made.109 If the actual amounts of the contingent payments differ 
from the projected amounts, either because the SIB-funded project is unsuccessful or the 
project satisfies a different level of outcome metrics, adjustments are made to reflect the 
difference at the time the actual payment amounts are first determinable.110 Moreover, 
this interest income will be subject to tax at a marginal rate of up to 39.6%, instead of the 
lower tax rates imposed on capital gains and dividend income.111 
 
2. Tax Exemption 
Current law provides a federal tax exemption for interest on bonds issued by a 
state or local government. 112  For the reasons discussed below, it is possible that a 
traditional SIB arrangement would not qualify for this tax-exempt status.113 
                                                      
105 Mazur, supra note 7, at 486. 
106 The majority of the SIBs implemented in the United States to date structure the SIB arrangement 
as a loan from investors to the project intermediary. See id. at 442. Although the Service is not bound by the 
debt label given to a SIB instrument, the instrument’s issuer and all holders of the instrument are generally 
bound by this characterization. See Notice 94-47, supra note 85. 
107 See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text. See also Mazur, supra note 7, at 486 (arguing 
that the totality of the factors weigh in favor of characterizing a traditional SIB investment as debt rather than 
equity). 
108 See Reg. § 1.1275–4(a) (applying the non-contingent bond method to certain debt instruments 
that provide for one or more contingent payments). Even if the SIB investment is characterized as a prepaid 
swap agreement, the tax consequences are likely to be similar. See also Mazur, supra note 7, at 463. The 
noncontingent swap method, which applies to prepaid swap agreements, is comparable to the noncontingent 
bond method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446–3. However, if the SIB investment is ultimately characterized as a 
different type of derivative instrument, such as prepaid forward contract, then the tax implications of a SIB 
investment will differ significantly. See Mazur, supra note 7, at 464. 
109 “Under the noncontingent bond method, interest on a debt instrument must be taken into account 
whether or not the amount of any payment is fixed or determinable in the taxable year. The amount of interest 
that is taken into account for each accrual period is determined by constructing a projected payment schedule 
for the debt instrument and applying rules similar to those for accruing OID on a noncontingent debt 
instrument.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1275–4(b)(2). 
110 See Id. 
111 I.R.C. § 1. This rate is effectively 43.4% for income that constitutes net investment income as a 
result of the 3.8% surtax imposed by Section 1411. I.R.C. § 1411. Similarly, capital gains and dividend 
income that constitute net investment income and exceed a statutory threshold are also subject to this 3.8% 
surtax. I.R.C. § 1411. 
112 See I.R.C. § 103. 
113 However, it may be also possible to structure a SIB arrangement in a manner that may qualify 
for tax-exempt treatment. Specifically, a SIB may be structured so that it does not satisfy the private use test 
and the private security or payment test or the private loan financing test and therefore does not constitute an 
ineligible private activity bond. Moreover, SIB proceeds that are used to pay service providers may be 
considered working capital expenditures that can qualify for tax-exempt treatment. Nevertheless, the 
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To qualify for the exemption, the bond issuer has to comply with numerous 
reporting and filing requirements.114 In addition, no portion of the bond may constitute a 
private activity bond.115 In other words, the bond proceeds may not benefit a private 
business or a person that is not a governmental unit.116 One exception to this rule is if the 
bond constitutes a qualified 501(c)(3) bond.117 In general, a qualified 501(c)(3) bond is a 
bond issued by a state or local government whose proceeds are used to finance property 
owned by 501(c)(3) organizations, such as charities or educational organizations, or 
governmental units.118 
Even though the proceeds of a SIB are also generally used to benefit charitable 
organizations, a traditional SIB arrangement likely does not qualify as a 501(c)(3) bond. 
A 501(c)(3) bond is disqualified from tax-exempt status if neither a 501(c)(3) 
organization nor a governmental entity owns all of the property financed by the net 
proceeds of the bond.119 A traditional SIB arrangement most likely fails to satisfy this 
requirement because neither a government entity nor a 501(c)(3) organization own any 
property as a result of the issuance of the SIB.120 Unlike most tax-exempt bonds that are 
issued to finance physical capital projects, such as schools, hospitals, airports, highways, 
or other types of public infrastructure or government facilities, a traditional SIB is not 
issued to finance the acquisition or building of any property.121 Instead, the SIB proceeds 
are used to finance social services that do not typically result in the creation of any 
tangible property. Thus, a SIB most likely fails to meet the statutory requirements of the 
ownership test. 
The features of a SIB also differ in several significant respects from current 
municipal bonds. Generally, a municipal bond is issued as either a general obligation 
bond or a revenue bond. A SIB does not appear to fall within either of these categories.122 
A general revenue bond is backed by the “full faith and credit” of the issuing government 
                                                                                                                                                   
uncertainty involved in determining whether SIBs qualify for tax-exempt treatment may be enough to deter 
some potential investors from claiming the exemption for tax purposes. 
114 An issuer also has to comply with requirements related to the “proper and timely use of bond-
financed property … and arbitrage yield restriction and rebate requirements.” I.R.S. Pub. No. 4079, Tax-
Exempt Governmental Bonds, 11 (Jan. 2016).   
115 I.R.C. § 103. Arbitrage bonds (as defined in Section 141 of the Code) are also ineligible for this 
tax-exempt status. Id. Although this raises interesting issues in the SIB context, it is likely that a SIB 
arrangement would not be considered an arbitrage bond. 
116 See I.R.C. § 141. A private activity bond is a bond that either meets the requirements of (1) the 
private use test and the private security or payment test; or (2) the private loan financing test. Id. 
117 I.R.C. § 141(b)(9). 
118 See I.R.C. § 145. 
119 I.R.C. § 145(a)(1). A 501(c)(3) bond is also disqualified from tax-exempt status if the bond 
satisfies both the modified private business use test and the modified private payment or security test. Id. The 
private business use test looks to whether more than 5% of the net proceeds of the 501(c)(3) bond issue are to 
be used for any private business use. I.R.C. §§ 145(a)(1), 141(b)(1). The private payment or security test is 
satisfied if more than 5% of the payment of principal or interest on the bond issue is either made or secured 
by payments or property used or to be used for a private business use. I.R.C. §§ 145(a)(1), 141(b)(2). 
120See Dao et al., supra note 37, at 15; OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, Investor Bulletin: Municipal Bonds (June 1, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipalbonds.htm [https://perma.cc/3NSK-MQHN]. 
121 See GRANT A. DRISSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (2016). 
122 See Dao et al., supra note 37, at 16 (concluding that “in attempting to find a home for the SIB in 
the current municipal framework, we found that there is no existing area of natural fit and believe it is likely 
that legislation needs to be passed in order to complement the issuance of a SIB”). 
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entity.123 Although a government entity may guarantee the full repayment of a SIB by its 
taxing power, this repayment is contingent on a particular social program achieving a 
certain level of success.124 This likely does not satisfy the criteria of a general obligation 
bond. 
A SIB likely also does not constitute a revenue bond. A revenue bond is a bond 
that is not backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer, but instead is backed by the 
revenue generated from a specified income-producing project.125 A SIB likely also does 
not fall within this bond category because projects financed by SIBs generally do not 
generate revenue. Instead, a successful SIB-funded project often generates government 
cost savings by improving a particular social issue.126 
In addition, a municipal bond is structured as a debt instrument with fixed or 
variable interest payments and a promise of the repayment of principal on the maturity 
date. Unlike a typical municipal bond, a SIB is a hybrid financial instrument that has both 
debt and equity features. Although it has a fixed maturity date, it does not have fixed 
interest payments. Instead, the return on investment depends on the success of the project. 
A SIB also does not provide for a repayment of the principal investment upon the 
maturity date. Instead, both the “interest” payments and the repayment of principal are 
contingent upon a social program exceeding certain performance thresholds. Thus, 
considering the cumulative effect of these differences, it is likely that traditional SIBs do 
not qualify for tax-exempt status. Instead, specific legislation is likely needed to make 
SIBs tax exempt.127 
 
3. Upfront Deduction 
Current law also provides a federal income tax deduction for donative transfers to 
qualified charitable organizations, which meet the requirements of a charitable 
contribution.128 Even though a traditional SIB investment generally involves the transfer 
of money or property to a qualified charitable organization129 and SIB investments by 
private investors, thus far, have been made primarily for philanthropic reasons,130 an 
                                                      
123 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Investor Bulletin: Municipal Bonds, supra note 120. 
124 See, e.g., Pay for Success Contract, supra note 87 (providing that the funds the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts uses to enter into pay-for-success contracts are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
Commonwealth). 
125 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Investor Bulletin: Municipal Bonds, supra note 120. 
126 See Dao et al., supra note 37, at 19.  
127 See id. at 16.  
128 I.R.C. § 170. A contribution or gift generally qualifies for the federal income tax deduction if it 
meets four requirements: (1) it is a transfer of money or property; (2) the recipient is a qualified organization 
as defined in Section 170(c); (3) the transfer is voluntary, donative in nature and exceeds the value of any 
actual or expected return benefit; and (4) the contribution is in proper form. See id.; Carla Neeley Freitag & 
Barbara L. Kirschten, Charitable Contributions: Income Tax Aspects, 863-3RD TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA), 
II(A) (Apr. 11, 2016). 
129 To date, the organizations that have operated as project intermediaries in U.S. SIBs have been 
qualified charitable organizations. See Mazur, supra note 7. 
130 See Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, supra note 19 (observing that the primary mission of SIBs is 
to “promote proven social benefit programs,” while any economic benefit or growth is only of secondary 
importance); Mazur, supra note 7; Robert Milburn, ‘Pay for Success Bonds’ Drum Up Interest, BARRON’S: 
PENTA DAILY (Jan. 13, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://blogs.barrons.com/penta/2014/01/13/pay-for-success-bonds-
drum-up-interest/ [https://perma.cc/DC5H-AZG2] (noting that “[m]uch of the private investor interest, at this 
point, has come from philanthropic-minded individuals and their foundations.”). 
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investment in a SIB-funded program is not likely to give rise to a deductible charitable 
donation. 
The tax law provides that a payment does not qualify as a charitable contribution 
unless the transferor “intends to make a payment in an amount that exceeds the fair 
market value” of any goods or services that it receives from the charitable organization.131 
However, a private investor in a SIB expects a return benefit. This is evident from the 
terms of the traditional SIB arrangement, which provide that if the SIB-funded program 
exceeds certain performance thresholds, the investor recoups its initial capital investment 
and possibly also receives a return on that investment.132 In other words, in addition to 
any social good the investment may generate, an investor generally also expects a 
financial return from its investment. Thus, it does not matter that the investor may 
potentially lose its entire investment or that the investor is willing to make this risky, low-
financial reward investment.133 This expectation of benefits is enough to disqualify an 
individual investor from deducting its payment upfront as a charitable contribution 
deduction.134 Instead, the SIB investment would generate a capital loss deduction only 
once (and if) the SIB-financed project fails to meet the pre-determined performance 
thresholds and the investor loses its investment. 
In conclusion, private investors who participate in SIBs do not currently enjoy 
any tax benefits related to their investment. Instead, these investments likely give rise to 
ordinary income taxable at non-preferential tax rates throughout the life of the project and 
only give rise to a limited capital loss deduction at the time an unsuccessful SIB-funded 
project is terminated. 
 
IV. SIBS AS A TAX-FAVORED INVESTMENT? 
Despite the SIBs’ potential to help tackle some of society’s toughest social 
problems or at least move us toward a more evidence-based, collaborative delivery of 
social services, the current tax law discourages private investments in SIBs. This situation 
arises because the current tax treatment of SIBs, like many novel financial instruments, is 
not clear, due to the difficulties in characterizing the arrangement under the traditional 
debt/equity analysis.135 This ambiguity creates an audit risk that may deter some private 
investors from investing in SIB arrangements especially given the speculative nature of 
the investment and the below-market rate of return.136 
Moreover, potential SIB investors have many options of where to invest their 
private capital. Among their choices are traditional equity investments and municipal 
                                                      
131 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A–1(h)(1)(i) (emphasis added). In addition, the payment must also actually 
exceed the fair market value of the goods or services. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A–1(h)(1)(i–ii).  
132 See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. 
133 See Stubbs v. U.S., 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970); Singer Co. v. U.S., 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 
1971); Mazur, supra note 7; Freitag & Kirschten, supra note 128, at II(E)(1)(b)(2). 
134 However, it is possible that certain SIB arrangements that are structured as a tranche loan 
structure may be bifurcated so that a portion of the transaction is treated as a charitable contribution with 
respect to non-profit investors that transfer funds to the SIB as junior lenders. See Mazur, supra note 7. 
135 Although the ambiguity that arises in applying the debt/equity analysis to SIBs is not unique to 
these transactions, it may nevertheless have a deterrent effect to risk-adverse investors. 
136 As discussed above, although often structured as a debt instrument, the traditional SIB 
arrangement does not necessarily constitute debt for tax purposes. See infra Part II.A. Moreover, if the 
investment is treated as an equity interest in the project intermediary, this may be cause a non-profit 
intermediary to lose its tax-exempt status. See Mazur, supra note 7. 
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bonds. This Part argues that despite sharing many similar features with a traditional SIB 
investment, each of these options receive better tax treatment than a SIB investment, 
which may further deter private investments in SIB-funded programs. Because no strong 
justifiable basis exists for discouraging SIB investments, this Part concludes that 
extending tax benefits to SIB Investments would be a sound policy choice. 
 
A. Traditional Equity Investments 
Given the below-market rate of return on a SIB investment and the potentially 
unfavorable tax treatment of a traditional SIB investment, a rational investor may be 
more incentivized to invest in a traditional equity investment. Even without considering 
taxes, a traditional equity investment with similar market risk would likely generate a 
higher rate of return than a comparable SIB investment and provide investors with more 
liquidity.137 
When taxes are taken into account, this disparity in return on investment is 
exacerbated, because a traditional equity investment generally also results in more 
favorable tax consequences than a SIB investment. In particular, a profitable equity 
investment is more favorable from a tax perspective, because it can generate income 
taxed at preferential tax rates.138 A non-corporate investor that receives qualified dividend 
income from a corporation will pay tax on that income at up to a 20% rate,139 whereas a 
SIB investor would pay tax on the same stream of income at up to a 39.6% rate.140 The 
traditional equity investor also benefits from a time value of money perspective. This 
advantage arises because the recipient of qualified dividend income generally would only 
be liable for taxes in the taxable year that the dividends are paid to her. A SIB investor, 
however, would be liable for tax on any projected return on investment prior to the time 
of actual payment under the non-contingent bond method.141 
As a result of these significant differences in tax treatment, the tax law likely 
distorts the capital market against SIB investments. This is undesirable from a policy 
                                                      
137 See Emily Gustafsson-Wright, Katie Smith & Sophie Gardiner, Public-Private Partnerships in 
Early Childhood Development: The Role of Publicly Funded Private Provision, BROOKINGS INST. (2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/global-20161129-public-private-partnerships.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NXE6-6NHY]. See also Erika K. Stump & Amy F. Johnson, An Examination of Using 
Social Impact Bonds to Fund Education in Maine, UNIV. OF SOUTHERN ME. (2016), 
https://usm.maine.edu/sites/default/files/cepare/Examination_of_Using_Social_Impact_Bonds_to_Fund_Edu
cation_in_Maine.pdf [https://perma.cc/M84Y-XQWF] (concluding that “[w]hile many venture market capital 
investors expect a return of up to 20%, SIB investments usually offer less than a 10% return”).  
138 See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1, 11) (providing for a preferential tax rate for qualified capital gains and 
qualified dividends). 
139 This rate is reduced to 15% if the taxpayer is not in the 39.6% tax bracket. In addition, this 
income may also be subject to a 3.8% surtax if certain income thresholds are met. See I.R.C. § 1411.  
140 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (discussing why a SIB investment is most 
appropriately treated under the non-contingent bond method under the current law, rather than as a corporate 
equity investment that gives rise to preferential tax rates). This income may also be subject to the 3.8% surtax 
on net investment income when certain income thresholds are met. See I.R.C. § 1411. 
141 Even if both an equity investment and SIB-funded project are unsuccessful, the tax implications 
to the equity investor are generally more favorable from a timing perspective. In both cases, the investor 
would recognize a capital loss at the termination of the investment. However, because the non-contingent 
bond method likely applies to the SIB investment, the SIB investor nevertheless has to report any projected 
return on investment on an annual basis. The SIB investor only accounts for any difference between the 
amount of income reported and the amount of the contingent return on investment that the investor receives, 
if any, at the time the contingent payment is made. See Treas. Reg. 1.1275–4. 
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perspective for several reasons. First, there is no justifiable reason for the distinction. 
Even though a SIB shares many features with a traditional equity investment, there is a 
strong argument that traditional SIB investments are not treated as corporate equity, but 
instead treated as contingent bond instruments and taxed under the less favorable non-
contingent bond method.142 Second, if SIB investments live up to their potential, they will 
produce a social good that should be encouraged, or at least not discouraged. Given that 
SIB investments, unlike traditional investments, are created to generate government cost 
savings and produce a social benefit, this does not make sense from a policy 
perspective.143 Also, as further discussed below, it is conceptually consistent with the 
policy behind the dividend and capital gains tax preference to extend similar tax 
treatment to income generated by SIBs. 
 
B. Tax-Exempt Bonds 
Alternatively, a SIB investor could have used its funds to invest in a municipal 
bond, in which case any interest generated would be exempt from taxation. 144  A 
municipal bond shares many features with a SIB arrangement. For instance, the proceeds 
of a qualified 501(c)(3) bond, a specific type of municipal bond, must be used for the 
benefit of charities, educational organizations, or other 501(c)(3) organizations and 
governments.145 Similarly, the proceeds generated by a SIB arrangement are often used 
for the benefit of 501(c)(3) organizations, because qualified nonprofit organizations 
generally perform the social services financed by the SIB. Thus, SIBs indirectly provide 
these nonprofit organizations the capital with which to operate and address a social issue 
that is aligned with that organization’s charitable mission. Moreover, SIBs are also 
specifically designed for the benefit of governments by funding programs and providing 
social services that have traditionally been provided by governments. These instruments 
are also intended to create savings for the government by improving social programs.   
Despite these similarities, as discussed above, it is possible that a traditional SIB 
arrangement does not qualify as a tax-exempt bond.146 A SIB investment is disqualified 
primarily for technical reasons. For instance, a SIB arrangement does not generate tax-
exempt income, because its proceeds are used to finance services, rather than physical 
capital projects. Section 501(c)(3) bonds, which qualify for tax-exempt treatment, are 
generally issued to fund the acquisition, development, or improvement of facilities used 
for the operation of non-profit organizations. The absence of property in the SIB context 
is likely one factor that precludes tax-exempt treatment. In addition, a SIB does not take 
on the form of either a general obligation bond or a revenue bond. Thus, despite the 
similarities, a SIB arrangement may not qualify for the same tax-exempt treatment. 
                                                      
142 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text; Mazur, supra note 7. 
143 See Cox, supra note 7, at 981–82 (arguing that “because the government already realizes 
significant savings upon successful completion of a SIB-funded program, legislators should consider 
exempting investor SIB earnings from capital gains taxation”). 
144 See I.R.C. § 103. 
145 See I.R.C. § 145. Alternatively, to qualify for tax-exempt treatment, more than 5% of the net 
proceeds of the 501(c)(3) bond cannot be used for any private business use and more than 5% of the payment 
of principal or interest on the bond must either be made or secured by payments or property used or to be 
used for a private business. Id. 
146 However, as also discussed above, it may be possible to structure a SIB arrangement in a 
manner so that it does not constitute a private activity bond. Supra note 113.  
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This disparate tax treatment likely distorts investment decisions away from SIBs 
and in favor of municipal bonds. Even though both SIBs and municipal bonds benefit the 
government or a non-profit entity and even though both offer lower rates of returns, a 
rational investor, who is motivated purely for financial reasons, would be more willing to 
accept the relatively low interest payments on municipal bonds because they are tax-
free.147 In addition, municipal bonds are generally considered a less risky investment 
given their relatively low default rates. On the other hand, a SIB investment is a high risk 
investment. It conditions repayment of principal on the success of a particular social 
program and has a novel and unique risk profile that is hard to measure. Consequently, 
SIBs, which do not offer any comparable incentives, carry a high level of risk, and 
function similarly to municipal bonds, are at a disadvantage relative to municipal bonds.  
In summary, as the above discussion demonstrates, the tax consequences to 
private investors who contribute funds to SIBs are generally unfavorable relative to 
comparable investments. However, there is no sound policy basis for this distinction. As 
a result, the current tax law creates unjustified inefficiencies and inequities, limits a SIB’s 
ability to attract private capital to expand in the United States, and prevents governments 
from effectively studying the true potential of SIBs to advance solutions to challenging 
social issues. 
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
By increasing compliance risks for SIB investors and granting tax-favored status 
to comparable investments, the current tax system creates administrative issues, distorts 
investment decisions, and treats similarly-situated taxpayers differently. Existing tax 
policies need to be changed to accommodate SIBs and minimize the discriminatory tax 
treatment towards private investment in SIBs.  
There are numerous ways that Congress can minimize the current, unfavorable 
tax treatment towards SIB investments. This Article focuses solely on tax policy changes 
that will treat SIB investments more in parity with comparable investments for tax 
purposes.148 Thus, in answering the question of which tax benefits enjoyed by other 
investments should be extended to SIB investments, it is helpful to understand why 
certain investments enjoy significant tax benefits. This Part briefly summarizes the 
commonly cited rationales for the tax benefits extended to certain investments and 
suggests several possible modifications to the federal tax system that would make the SIB 
arrangement a more tax-favored investment.  
 
                                                      
147 See Scott Greenberg, Reexamining the Tax Exemption of Municipal Bond Interest, TAX FOUND., 
(July 21, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/reexamining-tax-exemption-municipal-bond-interest/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JQS-BCU2].  
148 For instance, instead of providing a tax incentive, the federal government can incentivize SIB 
investments by granting money directly to state and local governments for social welfare purposes, which 
these governments may then use to increase the potential return to investors of SIB arrangements. This 
method is likely to be a simpler and more effective way to increase the attractiveness of SIBs. However, this 
Article does not argue that the federal government should promote SIB investments. Instead, this Article 
argues that the federal government should treat SIB investments similarly to other investments for tax 
purposes. Doing so would minimize the distortionary effects of the current law and enable the market to 
better determine whether SIBs make a worthy investment. For these reasons, this Article does not include 
other types of legislative solutions, such as direct expenditures, even though these legislative changes may 
better promote SIBs in some instances. 
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A. Preferential Tax Rates 
One option is to extend preferential tax rates to the income generated by SIB 
investments. Preferential tax treatment for capital gains has been a part of our tax system 
for nearly 100 years.149 Hence, it would not be unprecedented to subject the returns on a 
SIB investment to the same lower rate of tax. As discussed further below, it would also 
be conceptually consistent with the policy behind this preference to extend similar tax 
treatment to income generated by SIBs.  
The tax preference for capital gains has been justified on numerous grounds.150 
One common justification, and arguably the strongest justification, for the preferential 
capital gains tax rate is that this benefit will help minimize the lock-in effect.151 The lock-
in effect refers to the theory that a tax on capital gains upon a realization event will 
discourage investors from liquidating assets whose value has appreciated and reinvesting 
those proceeds in a new investment.152 Because a taxpayer is only taxed when he or she 
disposes of the asset, a taxpayer is therefore incentivized to hold onto his or her 
investments. This phenomenon creates market inefficiencies that “impedes the flow of 
capital to its most productive uses.”153 
Proponents of the capital gains preference also argue that the special tax 
treatment of capital gains is necessary to increase savings and to encourage risk-taking, 
both of which are necessary to achieve economic growth.154 This argument is based on 
the premise that subjecting capital gains to a lower rate of tax would induce more savings 
by removing some current tax disincentives on savings. 155  Similarly, reducing the 
effective tax rates on capital gains would minimize the current tax law’s negative effects 
on risk taking by increasing the expected return from a risky investment.156 
Another popular argument in favor of the capital gains tax preference is that 
without such preference, a successful investment would result in the bunching of income 
accrued over multiple years into a single year, thereby unfairly subjecting the income to a 
higher marginal tax rate.157 Proponents of a capital gains tax preference also argue that 
this lower tax rate is necessary, because the gain is not a genuine economic gain in that it 
does not reflect capital appreciation, but rather largely reflects inflation occurring during 
                                                      
149 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 98, at ¶ 46.1 (2017) (finding that “[s]ince 1921, with the 
exception of the years 1987 through 1990, capital gains were taxed more leniently than ordinary income …”). 
150 For a thorough discussion of the different justifications in favor of the preferential treatment of 
capital gains, see Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 252–58 
(1957). 
151 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-5-05, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION 
ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 22–23 (2005); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 95th Cong., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978 252 (2d Sess. 1979); Blum, supra note 150, at 252–58; Noel B. 
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 344–45 
(1993); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 477, 500 (2009). 
152 See Blum, supra note 150, at 256–58; Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 151, at 344–45; 
Johnson, supra note 151, at 499. 
153 Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 151, at 344–45. 
154 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-5-05, supra note 151; STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON 
TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, supra note 151, at 252; Blum, supra note 150, 
at 250; Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 151, at 340–44; Johnson, supra note 151, at 507–08. 
155 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-5-05, supra note 151, at 23–24 ; STAFF OF THE J. COMM. 
ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, supra note 151, at 252; Cunningham & 
Schenk, supra note 151, at 331–37. 
156 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 150, at 340–44. 
157 See Blum, supra note 149, at 253. 
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the period the taxpayer held the asset.158 Moreover, another justification given is that a 
lower tax rate is necessary to minimize the “tax-induced distortions in the capital 
markets”159 caused by the double tax on corporate income160 and the tax law’s preference 
for corporations to use debt rather than equity financing.161 This preferential tax treatment 
comes in the form of a reduced rate of tax on capital gains, as well as on qualified 
dividend income.162 Finally, many other justifications have also been given for the special 
tax treatment enjoyed by these types of investments including arguments that capital 
gains are not income, capital gains are unexpected, and that consumption, rather than 
income, should be taxed.163 
Not everyone supports the preferential tax treatment extended to capital gains 
and dividend income. As many commentators have already observed, this tax preference 
lacks a clear conceptual rationale.164 For example, there is no clear empirical evidence 
that supports the argument that this special tax treatment increases investments and 
stimulates economic growth.165 Instead, an increase in savings may not necessarily be tied 
to a lower tax rate on capital gains since many forms of savings do not constitute capital 
gains and the decision to save is often not solely dependent on the potential rate of return 
available.166 In addition, the bunching of income rationale is unpersuasive given that the 
taxpayers who realize capital gains are often already subject to the highest marginal tax 
rate.167 Furthermore, because of the realization requirement, capital gains also enables 
many taxpayers to benefit from the deferral of income. This deferral may potentially 
counteract some or all of the additional tax liability created by the bunching of income, as 
well as the taxation of the portion of the gain attributable to inflation.168  
Despite the foregoing, extending similar tax treatment to income generated by 
SIBs would neither be unprecedented nor inconsistent with the tax policy behind this 
preference. Regardless of whether or not one is in favor of or opposed to the capital gains 
tax preference, the current law provides for this tax preference. In addition, because there 
is no clear rationale for granting a tax preference to capital gains and dividend income, it 
is difficult to argue that granting a similar tax preference to SIBs is contradictory to the 
goals of the capital gains tax rate. Moreover, extending a similar tax benefit to SIB 
investments is arguably conceptually consistent with some of these rationales. For 
                                                      
158 See id. at 255–56. 
159 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-5-05, supra note 151, at 23–24. 
160 Corporate earnings are currently subject to two levels of taxation, because the income is taxed 
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instance, the binary, speculative and novel nature of SIB investments makes these 
investments inherently risky. By subjecting the returns on a SIB investment to a lower 
rate of tax, the expected rate of return on a SIB investment would increase, thereby 
making a SIB investment more attractive and encouraging risk-taking. Also, SIB 
investments often require an investor to make an illiquid investment of capital for four to 
six years, with all or a majority of the payments made towards the end of the investment 
term. Thus, SIB investments often create a bunching of income, which may result in a 
higher marginal tax rate for the investor. As with capital gains, this can be minimized 
with a lower tax rate.  
Finally, extending this tax preference to SIB investments is also consistent with 
sound tax policy. A failure to grant a similar tax benefit to SIB investments distorts the 
economics of private sector investment decisions and treats SIB investors less favorably 
than traditional equity investments. But it is unclear why a capital gain or dividend 
should be singled out for better treatment than other types of capital income, such as 
income generated by a SIB investment. Given that SIBs explicitly seek to provide not 
only financial returns, but also create a public benefit, they create a more compelling case 
for extension of these benefits. Moreover, SIB investments currently are structured so 
that economically they are more like equity investments than debt investments. In 
particular, an investment in a SIB shares many features of preferred stock. By allowing 
investors to recognize any return on their capital at preferential capital gain rates, this 
treats SIB investors in parity with investors of preferred stock who currently receive 
preferential tax treatment. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Congress should consider 
enacting legislation that grants SIB investors a preferential tax rate on any earnings from 
the SIB investment at the time of the distribution of that income instead of treating the 
projected returns on a SIB investment as ordinary income taxable on an annual basis. 
Alternatively, Congress should consider enacting a provision that provides 
successful SIB investments with tax benefits that are comparable to the benefits offered 
to qualified small business stock. The current tax code grants special preferential tax 
treatment to investments in qualified small business stock.169 This tax benefit allows 
investors of qualified small business stock that is held for more than five years to exclude 
50% of that gain from gross income. The remaining gain is subject to tax at a maximum 
rate of 28%.170 Together, these provisions effectively tax the gain from qualified small 
business stock at a preferential tax rate of up to 14%.171 The policy rationale given for 
this tax preference is that “targeted relief for investors who risk their funds in new 
ventures, small businesses, and specialized small business investment companies will 
encourage investments in these enterprises. This should encourage the flow of capital to 
small businesses, many of which have difficulty attracting equity financing.”172 Similarly, 
SIB investments also require investors to take on substantial risk in funding new social 
program ventures, which creates difficulties in attracting sufficient financing. Thus, based 
on the same rationale given for the qualified small business stock tax preference, the 
government can encourage the flow of capital to social projects by granting a similar tax 
benefit to SIB investments. This change would enable SIB investments to compete more 
fairly with both tax-exempt bonds and traditional equity financing for investors’ capital.  
                                                      
169 I.R.C. § 1202. 
170 I.R.C. § 1(h)(4). 
171 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 98, at ¶ 45.3 (2017). 
172 H.R. REP. NO. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 600 (1993).  
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B. Tax Exemption 
A second option is to exempt from taxation any gain that the investor realizes 
from its SIB investment.173  A similar tax exemption currently exists for the interest 
earned on state or local bonds.174 The federal income tax exemption for the interest 
earned on municipal bonds has been a part of the federal tax landscape since the 
enactment of the first federal income tax.175 For the reasons detailed below, this Section 
concludes that expanding the list of activities that qualify as tax-exempt private activity 
bonds to include the types of social services supported by SIBs is conceptually consistent 
with the rationale commonly given for this tax preference.  
In particular, the primary rationale currently given for the tax exemption of the 
interest on state and local bonds is that the tax exemption “encourages governments to 
provide the optimal amount of public services.”176 According to this economic theory, 
without this exemption, state and localities may be unwilling to undertake projects which 
benefit nonresidents who pay minimal tax in that jurisdiction.177  This tax exemption 
addresses this issue by lowering the cost of borrowing for state and local governments, 
which in turn incentivizes more investment in infrastructure and other local projects, 
regardless of who benefits.178 Specifically, the tax exemption enables state and localities 
to offer a lower rate of return than corporate debt and still attract investors who seek to 
maximize their after-tax returns.179 As a result, by exempting interest on state and local 
bonds, the federal government encourages public projects, which also have the added 
benefit of creating jobs.180 
This same line of reasoning applies in the SIB context. State and local 
governments are generally responsible for funding various social services, but may be 
unwilling to address certain social problems because they are politically unpopular, risky, 
or expensive. 181  Often, these types of programs target the poor and marginalized 
populations, involve high upfront costs, result in future, rather than immediate, cost 
savings, and may require the use of innovative, untested programs.182 As a result, state 
                                                      
173 Even though the proceeds of certain SIB arrangements may possibly qualify for tax-exempt 
treatment, the inherent uncertainties involved in determining whether the instrument qualifies for this tax 
benefit may deter qualified investors from claiming the exemption or potential investors from investing in 
SIBs. Thus, new legislation specifically including SIBs as tax-exempt instruments would be more effective in 
treating SIB investments in parity to municipal bond investments. 
174 I.R.C. § 103. 
175 Greenberg, supra note 147, at 2; Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 167–68.  
176 STEVEN MAGUIRE & JEFFREY STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A 
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177 Id. 
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181 See, e.g., SLC FAQ, supra note 1; Barajas et al., supra note 15, at 12, 17; Gustafsson-Wright, 
Smith & Gardiner, supra note 137; Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7; Liang, Mansberger & Spieler, 
supra note 19, at 273. 
182 See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 11; SLC FAQ, supra note 1; Barajas et al., supra note 
15, at 12, 17; Gustafsson-Wright, Smith & Gardiner, supra note 137; Kohli, Besharov & Costa, supra note 7; 
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and local governments may underinvest in the optimal amount and type of social 
services. For instance, “despite evidence about the effectiveness of preventive services in 
areas such as health care, education, and homelessness, budget officials and appropriators 
infrequently direct resources toward them.”183 But by extending the tax exemption to 
SIBs, the federal government could potentially encourage more private investment in 
SIBs, which would increase the availability of funds to finance these types of social 
projects and do so in a manner that may more effectively address certain social issues. It 
would also encourage cross-collaboration, which is necessary for adequately addressing 
certain challenging social issues.184 
In addition, a particular government entity may be unwilling to undertake certain 
SIB-funded projects, because it provides benefits that extend outside of the state or local 
jurisdiction where the program is implemented. This situation creates a “diffuse benefit” 
or “wrong pocket” problem because the return on investment that a particular government 
pays to SIB investors is calculated on the basis of budgetary savings and the benefits to 
society generated by a successful program, which may be partially realized outside that 
government’s jurisdiction. 185  For instance, the federal government may substantially 
benefit from SIB-funded programs targeting health issues and homelessness, because 
successful programs will result in budgetary savings to Medicaid and other federal 
programs, but a different government entity pays for these benefits.186 To address this 
issue, as one commentator has accurately noted, payments should ideally be funded by a 
combination of agencies that benefit from the outcome being achieved because benefits 
will accrue across multiple agencies and possibly across different levels of 
government.187 By having the federal government offer tax relief to encourage investors 
to invest in SIBs, this measure may help mitigate the diffuse benefit problem with respect 
to the federal government and encourage state and local governments to fund these types 
of social services even if they are not the sole beneficiaries. 
Moreover, extending this type of tax benefit to SIB investments may be 
necessary to treat comparable investments equally and thereby improve the equity and 
efficiency of our tax system. As discussed above, a SIB investment shares many features 
in common with a state or local bond investment. Because the federal government 
already offers tax relief to comparable investments, a failure to offer similar tax benefits 
to SIB investments may distort investment decisions away from SIBs and 
disproportionately favor tax-exempt municipal bonds. 
For these forgoing reasons, this Article argues that exempting the return on SIB 
investments from federal income taxation is another acceptable way to grant SIB 
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investments a tax-favored status. Even though the federal income tax exemption for 
municipal bonds is controversial, extending this benefit to SIBs is a potential policy 
solution to address the shortcoming of the current law, because this tax benefit currently 
exists for other investments and is conceptually consistent with the rationale commonly 
given for this tax preference.188 Moreover, the SIB structure minimizes some, but not all, 
of the negative implications of the current tax exemption granted to municipal bonds. 
For instance, one drawback of the current tax exemption for the interest on 
municipal bonds is that it may contribute to more socially wasteful investments. 
Specifically, opponents of the municipal bond tax exemption argue that this tax 
exemption creates economic inefficiencies by incentivizing the overinvestment in 
infrastructure.189 Because the tax exemption effectively lowers the cost of capital required 
for qualified projects, the exclusion of municipal bond interest may finance unnecessary 
state and local spending projects. 190  Similarly, extending the municipal bond tax 
exemption to SIB investments may also encourage governments to issue SIBs for 
unnecessary or ineffective social projects. The difference is that in the SIB context, the 
private market is likely to play a role in partially mitigating this risk. Because an 
ineffective social program will result in a SIB investor losing her entire capital 
investment, investors are unlikely to invest in unnecessary and ineffective social 
programs. Therefore, this criticism of the tax exemption is not as strong in the SIB 
context.  
Another common criticism of the tax exemption for municipal bond interest is 
that “[tax exemption] imposes greater costs on federal taxpayers than the benefits it 
confers upon state and local governments.” 191  Empirical evidence indicates that 
approximately only 80% of the federal cost of the tax exemption benefits the intended 
beneficiaries and thereby subsidizes state and local investment in capital projects.192 This 
inefficiency often arises because state and local governments have to issue municipal 
bonds with higher interest rates in order to economically appeal to an investor who is not 
in the highest marginal income tax bracket.193 As a result, instead of state and local 
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governments capturing the benefits of the tax exemption in the form of lower borrowing 
costs, the extra savings goes to taxpayers in high-income households.194 Furthermore, 
even to attract wealthy taxpayers, municipal bonds often have to bear premium interest 
rates because of inadequate market information, the illiquid nature of many municipal 
and the numerous alternative types of tax-advantaged investment options available to 
investors.195 
Although some of these issues may arise if a tax exemption is extended to the 
interest earned on SIB investments, the concern that a tax exemption is likely to primarily 
benefit high income investors is not as detrimental in the SIB context. In particular, one 
of the potential benefits of the SIB structure is that the involvement of investors who 
have business knowledge and experience could be a valuable asset in improving the 
delivery of social services.196  If this is true, then the additional cost to attract these 
investors may be worthwhile. Moreover, it may not be necessary for a SIB to bear a 
premium interest rate to attract these investors, since most private SIB investors are 
willing to accept a lower financial return, given that they already have wealth and that 
they are also receiving a non-financial return in the form of social benefits.197 
 
C. Upfront Deduction 
A third option is to allow SIB investors to deduct up to a certain amount of their 
SIB investment on their federal income tax return at the time of the investment and defer 
the recognition of any income until the time that it is realized. This type of tax preference 
currently exists for federal income tax purposes for certain investments.  
For instance, as discussed above, federal income tax law provides a deduction for 
qualified charitable contributions.198 One of the main policy rationales for the existence 
of this tax benefit is to help fund qualified charitable organizations. As the report of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means on the Revenue Act of 1938 states: “The 
exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes 
is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by 
its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations 
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general 
welfare.” 199  Investing in a SIB is consistent with this policy rationale. Although an 
investment in a SIB does not qualify for the charitable contribution deduction because 
there exists both a potential return of the contributed funds and a return on investment, a 
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SIB is used more like a charitable vehicle than an investment vehicle. In particular, SIB 
investments promote the general welfare and minimize the government’s financial burden 
by funding social services that generally would otherwise be funded by state and local 
governments. Moreover, given the below-market rate of return that many SIBs offer, 
SIBs currently primarily attract philanthropically-motivated, rather than profit-seeking, 
investors. 
Federal income tax law also provides an upfront federal income tax deduction to 
taxpayers that make qualified retirement contributions to a traditional individual 
retirement account (“IRA”).200 Pursuant to the terms of this tax preference, the amount of 
the contribution that is eligible for the tax deduction is subject to a contribution ceiling of 
$5,000, adjusted for inflation.201 Any distributions of principal or investment earnings are 
taxed at ordinary income tax rates unless rolled over into a different IRA or eligible 
retirement plan for the benefit of such individual within 60 days of the distribution.202 
The rationale for this tax preference is to encourage individuals to save for retirement.203  
Similarly, offering this type of tax benefit to SIB investments may also encourage 
taxpayers to save, but by investing in programs that potentially also produce a social 
good.  
Thus, another viable tax policy option is treating SIB investments similarly to 
qualified retirement contributions. Pursuant to this type of provision, SIB investors would 
be permitted to deduct a portion of their SIB investment upfront at the time of the 
investment and treat the receipt of any payments from the SIB investment as ordinary 
income subject to tax at the time of receipt. As a result, if the investment is ultimately 
unsuccessful, the investors are able to write off their losses as a tax deduction at the time 
of the investment, rather than waiting to take a deduction at the end of the project term. 
This upfront deduction would help mitigate some of the risk that investors bear when 
they invest in these speculative financial instruments that currently offer a below-market 
rate of return. In addition, as with qualified retirement contributions, this type of 
provision could also allow SIB investors to defer recognition of their gains if they 
rollover their funds to another SIB investment within a certain period of time. As one 
commentator has observed, “with traditional philanthropy, you pay for the program and 
then your money is gone; this way the money comes back and can be recycled into the 
system to help more people.”204 Thus, extending this tax benefit to SIBs would likely 
encourage reinvestment in SIBs and provide non-profit organizations with a more stable 
stream of income. 
 
D. The U.K. Approach 
Another possible approach to incentivize private investors to invest in SIBs is to 
enact legislation similar to that of the United Kingdom’s Social Investment Tax Relief 
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Act (“the SITR”), the first of its kind in the world.205 The goal of this legislation is “to 
support social enterprises seeking external finance by providing incentives to private 
individuals who invest in them.”206 The SITR provides up to three possible types of tax 
relief to qualifying individuals who invest in a qualified social enterprise.207 First, it 
allows investors to reduce their income tax liability by an amount equal to 30% of their 
investment.208 Second, any gain the investor realizes when it disposes of its investment in 
the social enterprise is exempt from capital gains tax.209 Finally, an investor may defer its 
tax on a capital gain that it realizes from the disposal of any kind of asset if the gain is 
reinvested in a qualified social investment.210 
Under this legislation, an investment in a SIB-financed program qualifies as a 
social enterprise eligible for tax relief if the investment is made through an accredited 
special purpose vehicle entity that is established solely for the purpose of entering into 
and carrying out a social impact contract.211 To qualify as an accredited special purpose 
vehicle, the entity must hold a social impact contract that satisfies the following 
conditions: (i) includes a government agency as a stakeholder; (ii) defines pre-determined 
outcomes intended to be achieved that are capable of being objectively measured; (iii) 
sets forth the method of measurement of these outcomes; (iv) requires periodic progress 
assessment; (v) makes at least 60% of the potential payments conditional on achieving 
the defined outcomes; and (vi) has a social or environmental purpose.212 
A qualifying investment in this entity may take the form of either an equity 
investment or a debt investment, provided that the investment meets certain requirements, 
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and must be held for at least three years.213 For instance, one requirement is that any 
dividend rights must be at a rate that depends on the enterprise’s financial success and 
which does not exceed a reasonable commercial rate.214 Similarly, if the investment is 
structured as a loan, the rate of any interest payable must not be more than a reasonable 
commercial rate and the principal and any interest must not be secured by any assets and 
must be subordinate to other debts of the social enterprise.215 To be eligible for this tax 
relief, SITR also imposes additional conditions to ensure that the investor’s capital is 
genuinely put at risk and to ensure that the investor is not related to or in control of the 
entity.216 
Although the goals of SITR are commendable, this article argues for a more 
modest tax incentive that is consistent with how comparable investments are currently 
treated for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Accordingly, this article argues for a 
preferential tax rate on investment returns, a tax exemption, or an upfront federal income 
tax deduction for the SIB investment, but recommends that Congress consider several 
aspects of the U.K. legislation when drafting legislation in support of a tax-favored status 
for SIB investments. 
First, the U.K. legislation is useful for studying its effects on private investments 
in SIBs and other social enterprises since it has already been enacted. Second, the U.K. 
legislation provides several structural elements and requirements that are necessary to 
properly regulate investments in social enterprises and which Congress should include 
when modifying the law to grant SIB investments a tax-favored status. For instance, to 
address concerns of abuse, fraud and collusion with respect to SIBs, this article 
recommends that Congress adopt the United Kingdom’s requirement that SIB 
investments need to be made through an accredited special purpose entity established for 
this purpose. In addition, as required by the SITR, any legislation extending tax benefits 
to SIBs should require that the SIB investment be held for a minimum period of time as a 
condition for the investor to qualify for the tax relief. This condition is necessary because 
non-profit service providers need the benefit of capital funding for an extended period of 
time to effectively implement social service projects.  
Moreover, because the purpose of this tax relief is to incentivize investors to 
invest in SIBs, which are speculative and offer a below-market rate of return, as opposed 
to more lucrative investments, the tax relief should not be available to SIBs that offer an 
                                                      
213 Social Investment Tax Relief, supra note 205. An investor can qualify for tax relief under SITR 
if it has invested in either: (i) shares issued by the social enterprise in exchange for full payment in cash or 
(ii) qualifying debt that has been wholly drawn down. Id.  
214 Id. Any dividend rights may not be of a fixed amount or at a fixed rate. Id.  
215 Id. In addition, in the event the enterprise winds up, the amount due to the shareholders is 
subordinate to any debts of the enterprise and does not have a preference in relation to any other shares of the 
enterprise. Id. Similarly, the debt investment cannot have a preference in relation to any shares of the 
enterprise. Id. 
216 See id. In particular, the investment will not qualify for tax relief if there is: (i) a pre-arranged 
opportunity for the investor to exit the investment during the three-year period beginning at the date the 
investment is made; (ii) a linked loan is made to the investor (a linked loan is defined as any loan which 
would not have been made on the same terms if the investor had not made the investment); or (iii) a principal 
tax avoidance purpose for entering into the arrangement. See id.; CABINET OFFICE, supra note 211. 
In addition, the investor is prohibited from being: (i) a partner or trustee of the social enterprise or 
its subsidiary; (ii) a paid director or employee of the social enterprise, its subsidiary, partner, or partner of a 
subsidiary of the social enterprise; or (iii) own more than 30% of the social enterprise’s ordinary share 
capital, loan capital or voting rights during the period one year before the investment to the third anniversary 
of the investment. Social Investment Tax Relief, supra note 205. 
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above-market rate of return or to the extent that the investor’s funds are not truly at risk. 
In particular, as discussed above, the SITR has a provision that requires that the return on 
investment may not exceed a reasonable commercial rate. A similar provision should also 
be adopted for purposes of U.S. SIB investments. Similarly, as with the SITR, if an 
investor’s funds are secured by assets or otherwise, the tax relief will also not be 
available. For instance, some SIBs currently provide a guarantee that ensure that a 
portion of the investor’s funds will be repaid regardless of the project’s success. The risk 
on this type of investment is already mitigated and therefore, should not benefit from the 
tax relief described above. Finally, regulations should be put in place to minimize 
collusion between the multiple stakeholders, ensure that the project’s outcomes are 
capable of objective measurement, and to guarantee the independence of the different 
parties. Some of these conditions are already included in the SITR, which currently 
imposes specific requirements to ensure that the investor is not related to or in control of 
the intermediary or non-profit entity.  
In summary, modifying the tax law to extend tax benefits, such as preferential tax 
rates, tax exemption, or an upfront tax deduction, to SIB investments is conceptually 
consistent with the availability of these tax preferences in other contexts and are possible 
ways to grant SIBs tax-favored status. For all the reasons detailed above, this article 
concludes that Congress should consider modifying the tax law to (i) subject the returns 
on a SIB investment to preferential tax rates similar to that of capital gains or qualified 
small business stock, (ii) exempt the interest earned on a SIB investment from federal 
income taxation, or (iii) provide an upfront federal income tax deduction for a certain 
amount of the private capital invested in a SIB with any returns on investment subject to 
ordinary income tax rates. In addition, to further encourage capital to remain in a SIB 
investment, this article also recommends that Congress allow the tax-free rollover of 
funds from one qualified SIB investment to another. Together these changes, along with 
legislation to properly regulate these novel instruments, should help prevent the current 
tax law from discouraging private investors from contributing capital to fund SIB-
financed projects aimed at addressing some our most pressing social problems. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current tax system significantly limits the ability of a SIB-funded program to 
attract sufficient private capital to establish a viable market in the United States. This is in 
large part due to the compliance risks that a SIB investment creates, as well as the 
unfavorable tax treatment of a SIB investment relative to comparable investments.  
Given the nearly $210 trillion of unrealized potential that the private markets 
hold, having access to this type of private capital can be a powerful tool for helping 
governments test whether SIBs can truly revolutionize the way we provide social services 
in the United States.217 In particular, if SIBs work as intended, they have the potential to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of social programs, thereby providing 
tremendous social benefit to high-need populations. Thus, this Article argues that 
legislation is warranted to provide certainty as to the correct tax treatment to private 
investors who participate in SIBs and to treat SIB investments more equally with current 
tax-favored investments that share similar features and policy goals. By adopting the 
                                                      
217 See Judith Rodin, Innovations in Finance for Social Impact, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Sept. 5, 
2014), https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/innovations-in-finance-for-social-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/PE3B-JZ45]. 
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changes proposed in this Article to make SIBs a more tax-favored investment, the federal 
government can ensure that the current law does not unnecessarily discourage the growth 
of this promising financial vehicle and minimize the inequities and inefficiencies that the 
current law creates. With this additional private capital, the development of SIBs can 
move forward on a larger scale and create an opportunity for social policy to evolve in a 
meaningful way. 
 
VII. APPENDIX A 
 










                                                      
218 Diagram adapted from What is Pay for Success?, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn/basics/#what-is-pay-for-success  [https://perma.cc/KX4U-RMME].  
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